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Corporations-Conditional Supermajority Provisions: Protecting
Shareholders' Interests-Seibert v. Gulton Industries, Inc., No.
5631 (Del. Ch. June 21, 1979), affd, No. 219, 1979 (Del. Jan. 4,
1980).
In Seibert v. Gulton Industries, Inc.,I the Delaware Supreme Court af-
firmed the dismissal of a complaint challenging the legality of a condi-
tional supermajority amendment 2 to Gulton Industries' certificate of in-
corporation. The challenged amendment required the affirmative vote of
eighty percent of Gulton's shareholders to approve a proposed takeover3
of Gulton by any person or entity that had acquired five percent or more
of Gulton's shares prior to its proposed takeover.4 The eighty percent vote
was not required if Gulton's directors had approved the proposed take-
over prior to the other entity's acquisition of a five percent interest in
Gulton. In such cases a simple majority sufficed. Thus, the amendment
gave Gulton's directors discretion to invoke the supermajority require-
ment for takeover attempts they opposed.
The chancellor's decision to dismiss plaintiff's complaint was consis-
tent with the enabling philosophy5 that permeates the relevant Delaware
statutory and case law. Nevertheless, the decision failed to discuss the
practical implications of enacting conditional supermajority require-
ments. Specifically, the chancellor did not consider whether Gulton's
conditional supermajority provision would adequately protect sharehold-
1. No. 5631 (Del. Ch. June 21, 1979), aff'd, No. 219, 1979 (Del. Jan. 4, 1980).
2. Delaware law ordinarily requires no more than the affirmative vote of a simple majority of
shareholders to approve a merger. Supermajority provisions, in contrast, require a higher percent
majority vote than is required by state law. Some supermajority provisions, as in Seibert, leave to
management's discretion the decision whether to invoke the supermajority requirement. Such provi-
sions are often referred to as "discretionary" or "shifting"; this note will hereafter refer to them as
'conditional" supermajority provisions.
3. A takeover occurs when an offeror purchases a controlling interest in the stock of another
corporation. Takeovers may be effected through public or private offers to purchase securities. Thus,
an offeror may publicly announce its intention to purchase during a fixed period all or a portion of a
class or classes of securities of a publicly-held corporation at a specified price or upon specified terms
for cash or securities. In so doing, the offeror has made a tender offer for the stock of the target
corporation. Alternatively, an offeror may effect his purchase of the target corporgtion's stock pri-
vately or on the open market. After completing a takeover, an offeror may vote to merge with the
acquired target corporation.
4. A five percent acquisition triggers the disclosure requirements of the Williams Act as amended
in 1970, Act of Dec. 22, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-567, 84 Stat. 1497 (1970), and is the percentage
frequently stipulated in defensive voting provisions.
5. According to the proponents of this philosophy, corporate law should merely facilitate the
free, private allocation of risks, profit, and control. Latty, Why Are Business Corporation Laws
Largely 'Enabling'? 50 CORNELL L.Q. 599 (1965). See generally Katz, The Philosophy of Midcen-
tury Corporation Statutes, 23 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 177 (1958).
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ers' interests to the extent they conflict with management's interests. By
dismissing the complaint, the Seibert court failed to consider whether the
use of conditional supermajority provisions should be circumscribed by
the courts in order to make such measures responsive to the needs of
shareholders. This note examines alternatives to dismissal of the plain-
tiff's complaint and recommends that corporate management be required
to disclose the purposes and effects of conditional supermajority provi-
sions when proposing them to shareholders for adoption.
I. BACKGROUND
Takeover bids are attempts to acquire control of a corporation through
the purchase of its stock on the open market or through a publicized ten-
der offer. 6 The use and success of tender offers increased dramatically in
the United States during the 1960's, 7 producing pressure for governmen-
tal regulation. 8 In 1968, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was
amended by the Williams Act 9 to include tender offers. The purpose of
the statute was to provide investors with basic substantive protections to-
gether with full disclosure of the terms, conditions, and financing of the
offer as well as the identity and pertinent background information regard-
ing the offeror.10 In the late sixties and early seventies, many states also
enacted statutes to regulate takeovers; these generally require that offerors
disclose certain information to target companies and investors. 11
6. Smiley, Do Tender Offers Damage Stockholders?, in THE ATTACK ON CORPORATE AMERICA
97 (M. Johnson ed. 1978). See generally E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPO-
RATE CONTROL (1973)(hereinafter cited as TENDER OFFERS).
7. TENDER OFFERS, supra note 6, at 64-65 & n.3.
8. Senator Harrison Williams of New Jersey first proposed federal regulation of cash tender of-
fers in October of 1965. Regulation was designed to protect "proud old companies" from raids by
"white-collar pirates." Ill CONG. REC. 28256-60 (Oct. 22, 1965)(remarks of Senator Williams on
S. 2731).
9. Act of July 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§
78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1976). For legislative history, see Hearings on S. 510 Before the Subcomm.
on Sec. of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); Hearings on
H.R. 14475, S. 510, Before the Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance of the House Comm. on Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968); H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1968); S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
10. The bill was designed to provide investors with full disclosure without favoring either the
tender offerors or the management of the target company. See H.R.REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1968); S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
11. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1603 (McKinney Supp. 1979-80); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
70, § 75 (Purdon Supp. 1980-8 1). In addition, these statutes often require that offers stay open for a
minimum period once made, HAWAII REV. STAT. § 417E-2(l) (1976), and that a hearing be held at
which state officials review the offer and the offeror's disclosure of statutorily prescribed informa-
tion, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.04.1(B)(4) (Page 1978). Some states also regulate substantive
aspects of the offer such as proration of acceptances in the event of oversubscription. VA. CODE §
13.1-530(c) (Supp. 1980); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36-463(c) (West Supp. 1980).
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Tender offers have continued to succeed despite the extensive legisla-
tion, however, and vulnerable corporations have developed an array of
defensive measures. 12 For example, a corporation may repurchase its
own stock by an open-market purchase or by a tender offer. The target
thereby reduces the number of shares available to the potential offeror and
increases the price of the target corporation's stock, which may cause the
offeror to look elsewhere for a better bargain. Or, a corporation may
place its stock in friendly hands to discourage tender offers. Generally,
such measures will either discourage future takeover bids or frustrate the
success of a bid that is already in progress. 13 Because a conditional super-
majority amendment both discourages future offers and frustrates offers
that have been made, it is a potent antitakeover measure.
II. THE SEIBERT DECISION
In Seibert, plaintiff claimed that the amendment adopted by Gulton
was illegal because it gave Gulton's directors discretion not authorized by
Delaware law. 14 Although it is true that supermajority provisions are not
specifically authorized by Delaware laws, several sections of Delaware's
General Corporation Law were relevant to plaintiff's claim. Section
25 1(c) provides that a merger agreement can be approved" [i]f a majority
of the outstanding stock of the corporation entitled to vote thereon shall
be voted for the adoption of the agreement." 15 Section 102(b)(4) allows a
certificate of incorporation to include provisions requiring the vote of a
larger portion of the stock than is required by the code. 16 Finally, section
102(b)(1) allows a certificate of incorporation to include:
Any provision for the management of the business and for the conduct of the
affairs of the corporation, and any provision creating, defining, limiting and
regulating the powers of the corporation, the directors, and the stockhold-
ers, or any class of the stockholders, or the members of a non-stock corpora-
tion; if such provisions are not contrary to the laws of this State. 17
Read together, these provisions allow corporate charters to require the
12. For a thorough discussion of these defensive measures, see TENDER OFFERs, supra note 6, at
219-76, and E. ARANow, H. ENHoRN, & G. BERt.STEIN, DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS FOR COR-
PORATE CONTROL 193-206 (1977).
13. See Note, Defensive Tactics Employed by Incumbent Managements in Contesting Tender
Offers, 21 STAN. L. REv. 1104, 1105 (1969).
14. No. 5631 at3 (Del. Ch. June 21, 1979).
15. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(c) (1975).
16. Id. § 102(b)(4).
17. Id. § 102(b)(1)(emphasis added).
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vote of more than a simple majority (i.e., a "supermajority") of stock-
holders for any corporate action, so long as state laws are not violated.
The chancellor also noted that Delaware case law had not directly ruled
on the validity of supermajority requirements. 18 One recent Delaware
case, Young v. Valhi, Inc., 19 involved an attempt to evade the require-
ments of a supermajority provision. In Young, the minority shareholders
sued to enjoin a proposed merger of a subsidiary into its parent corpora-
tion. The Young court held that the proposed merger failed to meet the
test of being entirely fair to the minority shareholders of the subsidiary
corporation because the majority had "manipulated corporate ma-
chinery" (by circumventing Valhi's supermajority provision) in an at-
tempt to "squeeze-out" the minority shareholders of the subsidiary cor-
poration. 20 Although the validity of Valhi's supermajority requirement
was not at issue in Young, the case approved it by implication. 2' Young
did not involve a conditional supermajority requirement like that adopted
by Gulton. 22
The chancellor also discussed an older Delaware case, Sellers v. Jo-
seph Bancroft & Sons Co., 23 in which preferred shareholders challenged
the validity of an amendment to Bancroft's certificate of incorporation.
The amendment, which a majority of Bancroft's shareholders had
adopted, lowered the percentage vote needed to change the designations,
preferences, and voting powers of the corporation's preferred stock. It
was held invalid because it altered contractual preference rights given
preferred shareholders in the charter by a fifty percent vote and not by the
seventy-five percent vote to which the preferred shareholders were enti-
tled under the charter. 24
The chancellor considered the decision in Sellers significant in relation
to Seibert because Sellers "seem[ed] to approve differing voting require-
18. In his opinion, the chancellor stated that "[t]he research of the parties has revealed no Dela-
ware precedent directly on point." No. 5631 at 4 (Del. Ch. June 21, 1979).
19. 382A.2d 1372 (Del. Ch. 1978).
20. Id. at 1378-79.
21. In Young, the chancellor held that a proposed merger, which involved circumventing a char-
ter provision requiring eighty percent of Valhi's stock to be voted in favor of a merger, was unfair to
Valhi's minority shareholders. 382 A.2d 1372, 1378-79 (Del. Ch. 1978).
22. The supermajority provision at issue in Young is characterized by Black and Smith as a con-
ditional supermajority amendment. See Black & Smith, Antitakeover Charter Provisions: Defending
Self-Help for Takeover Targets, 36 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 699, 722 n.80 (1979). However, Valhi's
amendment did not give its directors discretion to decide whether to invoke its supermajority require-
ment, and therefore is not conditional as that term is used in this note. See note 2 supra. For an
explanation of how Valhi's majority shareholders circumvented the supermajority requirement, see
McBride, Delaware Corporate Law: Judicial Scrutiny of Mergers-The Aftermath of Singer v. The
Magnavox Company, 33 Bus. LAW. 2231, 2243 n.55 (1978).
23. 2 A.2d 108 (Del. Ch. 1938).
24. Id. at 110-13.
Vol. 56:149, 1980
Conditional Supermajority Provisions
ments dependent upon the matter being voted upon." 25 He concluded that
Gulton's supermajority amendment also called for a different percentage
vote from the same class of shareholders depending upon the subject mat-
ter of the vote.26 Therefore, because the provision in Bancroft's charter
was valid under section 102(b)(4), Gulton's was valid also. In reaching
this conclusion, the chancellor implicitly reasoned that shareholder ap-
proval of a proposed business transaction endorsed by the board con-
cerned a "different subject matter" than shareholder approval of the
same type of transaction opposed by the board. 27
The chancellor concluded that plaintiff had failed to demonstrate that
the conditional supermajority amendment violated either Delaware law or
public policy. 28 He thus rejected plaintiffs assertion that Gulton's failure
to advise its shareholders of the amendment's illegality constituted dis-
semination of false and misleading proxy information and granted the de-
fendant's motion to dismiss. On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court af-
firmed without opinion. 29
III. ANALYSIS
Like all antitakeover provisions, Gulton's conditional supermajority
amendment was enacted to prevent undesirable takeovers. 30 A condi-
tional supermajority provision reduces the incidence of successful take-
overs in two ways. First, its presence in a corporation's charter chills of-
fers. 31 Potential offerors will hesitate before tendering an offer for a
corporation if an eighty percent vote of its shareholders may be required
to approve the transaction. Second, the amendment reduces the likelihood
that those offers which are made will succeed, because eighty percent of
the shareholders must vote in favor of the subsequent merger. 32
25. No. 5631 at6 (Del. Ch. June21, 1979).
26. Id. at 6-7.
27. Id. at 7.
28. Id. at 8-9.
29. No. 219, 1979 (Del. Jan. 4, 1980).
30. Gulton's proxy statement of May 23, 1977, in which the conditional supermajority amend-
ment was proposed, stated that the amendment was "designed to provide more effective resistance
against any sudden or surprise attempt by an outsider to take control of [Gulton Industries]." Proxy
Statement, addendum to Opening Brief of Defendant In Support of Motion to Dismiss at 6, Seibert v.
Gulton Indus., Inc., No. 5631 (Del. Ch. June 21, 1979).
31. Although it is impossible to determine the extent of this "chilling effect," antitakeover char-
ter amendments similar to Gulton's have discouraged offers. For example, Harold Simmons of the
Valhi case abandoned an attempt to takeover PSA, Inc. after PSA, Inc. adopted several antitakeover
charter provisions. Simmons pointed to the charter provisions as a reason for withdrawing the offer.
Wall St. J., Feb. 23, 1979, at 14, col. 1.
32. Antitakeover provisions "mak[e] it more difficult for the company making the tender of-
fer . . . to take . . . the second step of merging or otherwise combining with the corporation
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Although the degree to which a conditional supermajority provision in-
hibits takeovers is not measurable, 33 it undoubtedly discourages them. 34
The chancellor failed to discuss the policy reasons for discouraging take-
over bids or for supporting such bids. Further, assuming corporations are
allowed to take defensive measures against takeover bids, the chancellor
did not consider whether some measures better protect shareholders' in-
terests than others. Consideration of these issues is necessary if the courts
are to respond intelligently to conditional supermajority provisions.
A. Policy Reasons For and Against Takeover Bids
The decision to takeover a corporation is one of fundamental econom-
ics; a takeover will occur if the acquired corporation will provide a return
on invested capital, after acquisition costs, equal to or above prevailing
rates. 35 The first empirical study of cash tender offers concluded that the
corporation most vulnerable to a takeover attempt is one with a poor oper-
ating performance, declining dividend payments, and surplus liquid as-
sets. 36 This conclusion suggests that takeovers may benefit shareholders
by forcing "inefficient managers out of the system and replac[ing] them
with those who can do better." 37 Thus, takeovers arguably encourage ef-
ficiency and, hence, benefit shareholders and the economy as a whole. 38
On the other hand, takeovers may be viewed as "unfair opportunit[ies]
created by quirks in the market's valuation of a company or by overall
market conditions.' '39 Proponents of this theory maintain that ousted
managers are not necessarily less competent than their successors and
conclude that the benefits commonly associated with takeovers are rarely
realized. 40
whose shares are the object of the offer . . . by having a higher than usual vote required to approve
a merger or other combination with a company holding a significant stock interest in the target corpo-
ration." Mullaney, Guarding Against Takeovers-Defensive Charter Provisions. 25 Bus. LAW.
1441, 1442 (1970).
33. There is no way to know how many tender offers are abandoned in the planning stage when
offerors learn that their target's charter contains antitakeover provisions. See Black & Smith, supra
note 22, at 701 n. 11.
34. Although "[t]he effectiveness of [antitakeover] provisions is difficult to evaluate," the oppo-
sition by offerors to such provisions is "probably the best evidence that they do have some significant
effect." Mullaney, supra note 32, at 1462. See also TENDER OFFERS. supra note 6, at 260.
35. TENDER OF"ERS, supra note 6, at 2.
36. Hayes & Taussig, Tactics of Cash Takeover Bids, 45 HARV. Bus. REV. 135, 142 (1967).
37. [1979-80 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82.445, at 82,876.
38. Id. See also Fischel, Efficient Capital Market Theory, the Market for Corporate Control, and
the Regulation of Cash Tender Offers, 57 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1978).
39. [1979-80 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,445, at 82,876.
40. One author states that it is "frequently the best run companies, rather than those with inept
and inefficient managements, [which] are the most sought after takeover targets." Weiss, Disclosure
and Corporate Accountability, 34 Bus. LAW. 575, 585 (1979). Another author concludes that
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There is support for both views and it remains an open question
whether takeovers, on balance, benefit or harm shareholders. Inasmuch
as it cannot be said conclusively that takeovers harm shareholders, courts
should allow corporations to take defensive measures against them. The
conditional supermajority requirement is one available device. Such a re-
quirement presents additional questions that should be considered before
the proper response can be framed.
B. Special Policy Questions Presented by Conditional Supermajority
Requirements
A conditional supermajority provision differs substantially from a
fixed41 supermajority requirement in that the former gives discretion to
the directors to decide whether to invoke the supermajority vote require-
ment. Leaving this discretion with the directors creates a potential conflict
of interest between them and the shareholders each time a takeover bid is
made.. A fixed supermajority requirement presents such a conflict only
once, namely, when the amendment is proposed in the proxy solicitation.
Once a fixed supermajority requirement is adopted, the decision whether
to merge rests largely with shareholders. A conditional supermajority
amendment, however, raises the possibility of self-dealing by the direc-
tors with each proposed takeover. 42 For example, the directors may ap-
prove offers friendly to them, thereby increasing the likelihood that such
offers will succeed, even when they know that such offers will harm
shareholders. Moreover directors are likely to disapprove any offer that
threatens their positions in the corporation, 43 irrespective of whether such
an offer would benefit shareholders.
On the other hand, the discretion inherent in a conditional superma-
"[e]xperience does not prove that the shareholders of the target are better off if the target accepts a
takeover bid." Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom, 35 Bus. LAw. 101, 108 (1979).
41. A "fixed" supermajority requirement simply requires that a designated supermajority of the
corporation's shareholders vote to approve certain transactions. Fixed supermajority requirements are
less common today than they were several years ago, as managers prefer the flexibility given them by
recently developed, more sophisticated antitakeover devices such as Gulton's conditional superma-
jority amendment. For a discussion of various types of supermajority provisions, see Black & Smith,
supra note 22, at 713-15.
42. The Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission alluded to this potential problem
in a speech delivered Jan. 17, 1980 to the Seventh Annual Securities Institute. In discussing the
discretionary feature of Gulton's amendment, he stated "[w]hether such apparent flexibility will re-
suit in abuses-such as its use as a bargaining chip to enhance incumbent management's interests at
the expense of shareholders-will be a subject of continuing concern." [1979-80 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 82,445, at 82,882.
43. Managers fear losing their jobs, and have a "natural desire to remain in control" of the
corporations that employ them. Condec Corp. v. Lunkenheimer Co., 43 Del. Ch. 353, 363, 230
A.2d 769, 776 (1967).
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jority requirement may benefit shareholders if it is used properly. For ex-
ample, the directors may refuse to approve a pending offer if they think
that acquisition by the particular offeror will not benefit the corporation.
Withholding approval will trigger the supermajority requirement, de-
creasing the likelihood of the offeror's success. 44 Or, the directors may
condition their approval on an increase in the offeror's offered price per
share. This will pressure the offeror either to increase the price, which
will benefit shareholders, or to forego managerial approval and risk not
receiving the required supermajority vote.
Given the potential for a conflict of interest, the chancellor in Seibert
should have considered whether a meaningful remedy exists for share-
holders who allege that the directors have abused their discretion to re-
quire a supermajority.
The only remedy the chancellor's decision left the shareholders is a
cause of action against corporate directors for abuse of discretion. Dela-
ware courts have long held that corporate management stands in a fiduci-
ary relation to shareholders and has a duty to deal with them "fairly and
justly." 45 It is questionable whether applying this standard produces a
meaningful remedy, however, because Delaware courts readily defer to
corporate management's 46 business decisions and presume that they have
been made in good faith in the absence of evidence to the contrary. 47 If
directors were sued for abuse of discretion in invoking or not invoking the
conditional supermajority provision, it is likely that they could satisfy
Delaware courts that they had a "business purpose" sufficient to justify
their decision to approve or oppose a tender offer. 48 Therefore, until Del-
aware courts are willing to heighten their scrutiny of asserted "business
purposes," 49 it will remain difficult for a shareholder to demonstrate that
an abuse of discretion has occurred.
44. See note 37 supra. But cf. Black & Smith, supra note 22, at 701 & n. Il (questioning whether
antitakeover provisions impede tender offers).
45. Id. at 363, 230 A.2d at 775 (quoting Yasik v. Wachtel, 25 Del. Ch. 247, 256, 17 A.2d 309,
313 (1941)).
46. "Judicial decisions in Delaware illustrate that the courts have undertaken to . . . create a
'favorable climate' for management." Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Del-
aware, 83 YALE L. J. 663, 670 (1974).
47. For example, in Allaun v. Consol. Oil Co., 147 A. 257 (Del. Ch. 1929), a minority share-
holder alleged that a proposed sale of Consolidated's assets to Huff Oil Co. was fraudulent in that the
consideration to be paid was grossly inadequate. The court dismissed the complaint, and held that the
directors' judgment in setting the terms of the sale was presumed to have been exercised honestly and
in good faith. Id. at 263.
48. For example, they could argue that the price offered was too low or that the proposed offer
was not in the corporation's best interests.
49. Recently, the Delaware Supreme Court did increase its scrutiny of business purposes in "go-
ing private" transactions. See Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977).
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C. Possible Judicial Responses to a Conditional Supermajority
Requirement
The chancellor's decision to validate Gulton's amendment was not
compelled 50 by Delaware law and gave Gulton's directors a discretion
unduly susceptible to abuse. For these reasons, the chancellor should
have explored alternatives to dismissal of plaintiffs complaint in deter-
mining the best remedy.
1. State Imposed Disclosure
One alternative is to require corporate management to disclose the pur-
pose and effects of conditional supermajority provisions when proposing
them to shareholders for adoption.
A duty to disclose could be imposed through existing Delaware pre-
cedent. 51 Enforcement of the duty would require after-the-fact judgments
on the fairness and adequacy of management's disclosure. Several cases
have applied a fairness test52 to determine whether the terms of proposed
mergers sufficiently protected the interests of minority shareholders. A
similar fairness test could be applied to a conditional supermajority
amendment to determine whether management's disclosure sufficiently
protected shareholders' interests.
Disclosure would benefit shareholders by informing them of the advan-
tages and disadvantages of a proposed antitakeover measure. Disclosure
leaves shareholders free to choose for themselves whether an antitakeover
measure is desirable. Undercutting the advantages of disclosure, how-
ever, is the fact that it would be difficult for a court to decide whether
disclosure was adequate in a given situation. Delaware courts often defer
to corporate management's invocation of the "business judgment"
50. See note 18 supra. Young and Sellers had implicitly approved supermajority requirements,
but neither case involved a conditional supermajority requirement. See note 21 supra for a discussion
of the Young case. See text accompanying notes 23 & 24 supra for a discussion of the Sellers case.
Section 102 of the Delaware General Corporation Law authorizes "fixed" supermajority require-
ments, but is silent on the question whether conditional supermajority requirements are authorized by
Delaware law. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102 (1975).
51. Delaware courts could require that management fully reveal to shareholders the potential
advantages and disadvantages of such provisions as a part of its general fiduciary duty to deal fairly
with them. See Yasik v. Wachtel, 25 Del. Ch. 247, 17 A.2d 309, 313 (1941) ("[i]t is fundamental
that directors stand in a fiduciary relation to the corporation and its shareholders, and that their pri-
mary duty is to deal fairly and justly").
52. In Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 93 A.2d 107 (Del. 1952), the court held that in an
"interested merger," such as a merger between a parent and a subsidiary corporation, the test to be
applied is intrinsic fairness and that the defendant corporation has the burden of establishing that the
merger terms are fair to all parties. The court continued to apply this doctrine in Singer v. Magnavox
Co., 380 A.2d 969, 980 (Del. 1977).
Washington Law Review
rule, 53 and the effectiveness of the duty to disclose would depend in large
part upon whether Delaware courts were willing to look beyond the form
of disclosure to scrutinize its contents. 54 Even assuming courts would not
defer to management's judgment, applying the fairness test to disclosure
would be difficult. Deciding whether events occurring subsequent to the
adoption of a supermajority charter provision were so reasonably foresee-
able that management should have described the possibility of such a con-
tingency to shareholders would not be easy.
2. SEC Imposed Disclosure
A duty to disclose could also be imposed on management through rule-
making by the Securities and Exchange Commission. On October 13,
1978, the SEC issued Exchange Act Release No. 15230 (Release), 55 in
which the SEC's Division of Corporate Finance made public its concern
over the adequacy of disclosure with respect to antitakeover provisions. 56
Although the Release states that its instructions are "merely for the guid-
ance of [its] staff,"57 it is clearly "designed to put issuers on formal no-
tice that in the Division's view antitakeover proposals are inherently sus-
pect and will be scrutinized accordingly for completeness of
disclosure.' '58
The Release contains special recommendations regarding disclosure of
supermajority provisions. 59 The Division recommends that issuers dis-
close whether the supermajority provisions will, under any circum-
stances, give management a veto power over the transaction being voted
upon, despite the fact that a majority of the corporation's shareholders
want to approve the deal. Furthermore, if the supermajority provision
would give a minority of shareholders power to veto a merger that had
been approved by management or a majority of the shareholders, that fea-
ture should be disclosed. Lastly, disclosure should be made with respect
53. See generally, Cary, supra note 46, especially 680-81.
54. In the past, Delaware courts have not been willing to do this. See note 46 and accompanying
text supra.
55. SEC Exchange Act Release No. 15230, [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) "
81,748 (Oct. 13, 1978) [hereinafter cited as Release].
56. Id. The Release recommends that disclosure of antitakeover provisions be set forth promi-
nently and in one place in the proxy materials that are mailed to shareholders. Id. at 80,986. It also
recommends that disclosure include the reasons why management is proposing to amend the charter.
In addition, the requirement's effect, its advantages and disadvantages, and its mode of operation
should be stated. Id. at 80,986-87.
57. Id. at 80,984.
58. Black & Smith, supra note 22, at 702.
59. Release, supra note 55, at 80,987.
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to whether a supermajority vote is needed to adopt or repeal the provi-
sion.60
The Release and any rule that may be promulgated pursuant to it can be
enforced under SEC Rule 14a-9(a), which prohibits solicitation of votes
by a proxy statement that is false or misleading with respect to a material
fact or that omits to state a material fact needed to make other statements
therein not false or misleading. 61 The SEC, a solicited shareholder, 62 or
the corporation may bring suit to enforce 14a-9(a). Possible remedies
include enjoining any further solicitations with the defective materials,
enjoining the voting of proxies received through solicitation with the de-
fective materials, or rescinding any action taken on the basis of the prox-
ies so acquired. The current standard used to determine the adequacy of
disclosure under 14a-9(a) is "[flair accuracy, not perfection." 63 Federal
courts are available to enforce the Release and any rules that may follow
it.
Similar to state-imposed disclosure, SEC-imposed disclosure of the ef-
fects of antitakeover proposals benefits shareholders by allowing them to
decide for themselves whether to enact such proposals. The Release con-
tains recommendations to issuers that will help them determine what in-
formation should be disclosed. The Release has been criticized as short-
sighted, however, in that it requires too much disclosure, which may
make it difficult for management to convince shareholders that there are
valid reasons for enacting antitakeover proposals. Additionally, it will be
difficult for courts to decide whether the Release's disclosure require-
ments were met when reviewing solicitation statements whose adequacy
has been challenged.
3. Banning Conditional Supermajority Requirements
The other alternative to the chancellor's decision is to ban conditional
supermajority provisions. This option would preclude managerial self-
dealing that may -be present when conditional supermajority provisions
are allowed. Banning conditional supermajority provisions would also
spare corporate managements and courts the task of deciding what is
"fair" disclosure in a given situation.
Banning such amendments, however, presents two problems. First, it
60. Id.
61. See Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 584 F.2d 1195, 1199 (2d. Cir. 1978).
62. The Supreme Court has upheld the right of private litigants to bring an action in their own
name or to bring a derivative suit on behalf of the corporation to enforce the proxy rules of 14(a). J. I.
Case Co. v. Borak Co., 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
63. See Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 584 F.2d 1195, 1200 (2d. Cir. 1978).
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is a paternalistic response; it deprives shareholders of the opportunity to
approve such measures if they so desire. 64 Second, banning conditional
supermajority provisions is an extreme measure, unwarranted in the ab-
sence of strong evidence that such provisions rarely serve the interests of
a corporation's shareholders. Such evidence has not been adduced. 65
D. Recommendation & Conclusion
There is no ideal solution to the conflict of interest problem presented
when an antitakeover provision, such as Gulton's supermajority amend-
ment, is proposed by management to shareholders for adoption. Of the
available solutions, however, disclosure is preferable because it informs
shareholders and leaves them free to decide for themselves whether to
adopt antitakeover provisions. Because Delaware courts defer readily to
corporate management, it is unlikely that they will fashion a duty to dis-
close from existing precedent. Thus, SEC-imposed disclosure is the more
promising solution. At present, Rule 14a-9(a) requires full and fair dis-
closure in proxy solicitations 66 and thus, could be used to challenge the
adequacy of disclosure when antitakeover proposals are made. The SEC
is currently deciding whether to promulgate rules requiring disclosure of
antitakeover proposals. SEC rules could benefit both shareholders and
management if they are carefully drafted, keeping the interests of share-
holders, management, and the corporation itself in mind.
Constance M. Crawley
64. Shareholders may conclude that corporate management is better qualified than they are to
judge the desirability of potential offers. For that reason, they may wish to give management discre-
tion to invoke the supermajority requirement for offers they deem undesirable.
65. Black & Smith, supra note 22, at 731, conclude that "there is a glaring lack of evidence that
the antitakeover provisions now being adopted .. . unfairly interfere with stockholder's rights."
66. See Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 584 F.2d 1195, 1199 (2d. Cir. 1978).
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